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AbsTrACT
This article analyses how World War II shifted and 
contained embodied experiences of waiting in relation 
to broader ideas of lived time in modernity. The trench 
warfare of World War I has often been imagined as 
a limit experience of anxious waiting, but World War 
II produced compelling accounts of experiences of 
suspended time in civilian populations exposed to the 
threat and anticipation of ’total war’. This article analyses 
representations of this suspended present drawn from 
Elizabeth Bowen and Virginia Woolf, alongside materials 
in the Mass Observation Archive, to develop an account 
of how exposure to a future shaped by the potential 
of annihilation from the air reshaped experiences of 
durational temporality and the timescapes of modernity 
in the London Blitz. It also explores the relationship 
between anxiety, waiting, and care by attending to 
psychoanalytic theories that developed in the wartime 
work of Wilfred Bion and Melanie Klein. Extending 
Freud’s account of anxiety as producing ’yet time’, 
this article describes how and why both literary and 
psychoanalytic texts came to understand waiting and 
thinking with others as creating the conditions for taking 
care of the future.
At some point in 1940, during a period 57 days 
of consecutive bombing, a woman and a man are 
imagined walking together in London:
Full moonlight drenched the city and searched it; there 
was not a niche left to stand in. The effect was re-
morseless: London looked like the moon’s capital—
shallow, cratered, extinct. […]
However, the sky, in whose glassiness floated no clouds 
but only opaque balloons, remained glassy- silent. The 
Germans no longer came by full moon. Something 
more immaterial seemed to threaten, and to be keep-
ing people at home. This day between days, this extra 
tax, was perhaps more than senses and nerves could 
bear.1
First published in 1944, when the V1s and V2s were 
now flying overhead, Elizabeth Bowen’s ‘Myste-
rious Kôr’ takes a ‘shallow, cratered, extinct’ lunar 
landscape more commonly associated with World 
War I and transports it to civilian London. The 
young woman, Pepita, is walking with her soldier 
lover, Arthur, and suddenly imagines another brittle 
bright, uncanny place:
 ‘Mysterious Kôr thy walls forsaken stand
 The lonely towers beneath the lonely moon—’
Pepita goes on, describing Kôr as ‘a completely 
forsaken city, as high as cliffs and as white as bones, 
with no history’.2 But she then muses: ‘If you can 
blow whole places out of existence you can blow 
whole places into it’.3 She imagines Kôr as some-
where she and Arthur might live and be alone, 
instead of the pinched ‘flatlet’ Pepita shares with a 
girl called Callie to which they are about to return. 
Another space in which bodies might be able to 
subsist and express their desires gets blown into 
Pepita’s mind by the Luftwaffe. But if Kôr is another 
kind of place, the hallucinated ‘timeless city’ also 
represents a new temporality that emerges from 
this suspended time of aerial bombardment. This 
article sets out to explore the qualities and social 
life of this waiting time, suggesting that the ‘day 
within days’ blown into existence by the lived real-
ities of 20th century industrialised war both tracks 
the timescapes of modernity and is significantly 
illuminated by the demands and impossibilities of 
care such times evoked. By paying particular atten-
tion to anxious temporal experiences in literary and 
psychoanalytic texts of World War II, it examines 
how waiting and thinking with others came to be 
understood as creating conditions for taking care 
of the future.
YeT Time
The poem Bowen has Pepita half- remember is ‘She’ 
by Andrew Lang. Published in 1888, it is dedicated 
to H. Rider Haggard, the author of the first novel 
in the ‘lost world’ subgenre of scientific romance: 
She: A History of Adventure (1886–87). She was an 
extraordinarily popular piece of imperial adventure 
fiction concerning a lost, ruined city called Kôr in 
Africa and a white queen, Ayesha, who has been 
waiting more than two millennia for her reincar-
nated lover. In a 1947 radio broadcast, Bowen spoke 
of the thrill of first reading She as a bored 12- year 
old and being prepared thereafter ‘to handle any 
book like a bomb’4—ready for the incendiary qual-
ities of fiction capable of exploding creativity in the 
waiting adolescent mind. But what strikes Pepita is 
that both novel and poem were written ‘when they 
thought they had got everything taped, because the 
whole world had been explored, even the middle 
of Africa’. And this leads to her assertion that ‘[t]he 
world is disenchanted’5—a quotation from Lang’s 
poem that is linked, through Schiller, to the Roman-
ticism of a pagan world lost and past, but which 
goes on to resonate through the 20th century via 
Max Weber’s articulation in 1917 that in modernity 
‘there are no mysterious incalculable forces that 
come into play […] one can, in principle, master 
all things by calculation. This means that the world 
is disenchanted’.6 Both Lang’s poem and Haggard’s 
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novel address the Victorian sense that the final spatial frontier 
had been reached. This sense of boundedness led to scientific 
romances opening up new worlds beyond land- locked geogra-
phies by crossing temporal frontiers into a time in which posi-
tivist historical progress has been radically suspended.7 But the 
‘enchanted’ world that Pepita finds in Kôr, like the one Bowen 
finds in the supernatural genre, is not an evasion of modernity, of 
history. Instead, it slips into view in the uncanny places and times 
historical modernity produces: in new communication technol-
ogies like telephones;8 in the city under aerial bombardment; in 
the air raid shelter; in the reconfigured Victorian drawing- rooms 
carved into cramped flats with paper- thin walls.
At one level Kôr is simply an escape: a fantasy space outside 
of the dreary, straitened conditions of wartime London where 
Pepita and Arthur do not have to wait be alone. Kôr is also a 
suspended moment where the passage of time does not bring 
the lovers any closer to their deaths. But it is also clear that the 
fantasy of Kôr, which tricks its way into consciousness through 
war, also tracks particular modes of temporal extension that war 
produced, as people drifted ‘afloat on the tideless, hypnotic, 
futureless to- day’.9 Bowen’s short story certainly takes place 
in an interval that seems out of time. As she writes in her US 
postscript to The Demon Lover collection, these short story 
fantasies are ‘by- products of the non- impulsive major routine of 
war. These are between- time stories—mostly reactions from, or 
intermissions between, major events. They show a levelled- down 
time’.10 Indeed, almost nothing happens in ‘Mysterious Kôr’ in 
terms of narrative action. Arthur and Pepita walk and return to 
the flat where Callie has given up waiting for them and fallen 
asleep. Callie appears like votive candle—‘sedate, waxy and 
tall’—with her virginal vigil representing another kind of waiting 
to contrast with Pepita’s passionate, embodied immediacy. Callie 
and Pepita share a bed while Arthur sleeps on the divan. Callie 
goes to speak to Arthur at 4am. They talk. Nothing happens. 
Callie goes back to bed where Pepita seems to be dreaming of 
Kôr. But Bowen’s adumbration of the time taken when nothing 
takes place, again and again, is a way of doing justice to the 
experience of war in London where soldiers and civilians alike 
faced potential annihilation from the air. As Bowen herself put 
it, ‘[t]here are no accounts of war action’ in these stories; they 
are ‘studies of climate, war- climate’.11 For the majority who 
came through an air raid, their continued existence signalled 
that a certain kind of nothing had indeed happened to them. 
Surviving represented both the banality of nothing occurring 
and a jewelled sense of fortune’s touch—in HD’s description of 
the aftermath of aerial bombardment, ‘[h]our is cut from hour 
in precious prismatic fragments […] An extra day has been given 
us’.12 Although anxious waiting for news of loved ones strongly 
characterised affective life for civilians in World War I,13 to have 
survived the Blitz on the home front of World War II was to have 
endured and perhaps temporalised internally a rather different 
experience of waiting: the particular psychic states elicited by 
drawn out nights in vulnerable houses, air raid shelters, or in the 
underground, waiting for bombs to drop that had not yet come 
for them.
The suspended animation of ‘Mysterious Kôr’ resonates with 
Paul Saint- Amour’s reading of the interwar period as a waiting 
time, ostensibly between World War I and the end of World War 
II, but still present in Cold War literatures and in many of the 
preoccupations of the present, that was dominated by a fright-
ened anticipation of conflict to come.14 By 1932, Prime Minister 
Stanley Baldwin had insisted in a speech called ‘A Fear for the 
Future’ that the ‘man in the street’ must ‘realise that there is no 
power on earth that can protect him from being bombed […] the 
bomber will always get through’.15 According to Saint- Amour, 
the possibility of total war, experienced by civilians in perhaps 
its clearest form via the air- raid, produced a very particular 
cultural phenomenon: a collective anxiety about exposure and 
threat that shaped the possibility of the future itself. Although 
most people were not physically injured by bombs during the 
Blitz, Michal Shapira has noted the ubiquity of experiences of 
anxious waiting: ‘[o]n average, Londoners were threatened once 
every 36 hours for more than 5 years, with sirens heard on 1224 
occasions’.16 And as Saint- Amour puts it, this anxious threat of 
destruction produced its own trauma: ‘violence anticipated is 
violence already unleashed’.17
Saint- Amour argues, however, that most of the cultural and 
critical engagement with war has concentrated on traumatic 
memory and on a stuck temporality concerned with unbidden 
repetitions of the past. And this comes at the expense of the 
possibility of understanding the collective experience of ‘the 
eventuality of a future- conditional war’: ‘a proleptic mass trau-
matisation: a pre traumatic stress syndrome’.18 Saint- Amour 
indeed reads Freud’s 1926 work on anxiety dismissively, finding 
only the seemingly strange idea that anxiety neuroses, even in 
wartime, emerge from a psychosexual ‘historical factor’ reacti-
vated in the present to produce a traumatised response.19 But 
although we may be afraid of things we know to be dangerous, 
in her more sympathetic account of Freud’s thinking Lynsey 
Stonebridge explains that ‘we are not actually anxious about 
the things we know’; instead, anxiety neurosis ‘tells the affec-
tive history of a life that is not consciously known—the life of 
the unconscious and of fantasy, […] the traumatic childhood of 
the real dangers of the present moment’.20 In Freud’s view, as 
with all symptoms, anxiety neurosis is produced in relation to a 
‘danger situation’ (either external or internal) as an attempt to 
manage in the present a psychic disequilibrium emergent from 
a reaction to a possible future, but determined by a traumatic 
structure laid down in the past. Anxiety, like waiting, is always 
orientated towards a future; but the capacity to tolerate the 
affects produced by these dependent relationships towards the 
future are determined by one’s expectations of what it might 
bring. Will it deliver something that will have been worth the 
wait, or a repetition of deprivation or violence? The quality of 
expectation is necessarily drawn from experience in the past, but 
the practice of waiting requires imagining and enduring in the 
present at least the possibility of a future where things would be 
different.
Although Saint- Amour insists that ‘Freud’s metapsychology 
remains fixated on the subject’s primordial past, recollected or 
repressed’,21 Freud is less definitively turned towards the past 
than he implies; rather, as Stonebridge puts it, anxiety looks 
‘both forwards and backwards’.22 Waiting for something that 
evokes the possibility of annihilation and a breaking apart 
the psyche cannot imagine itself surviving will likely produce 
anxiety automatically. But Freud’s more counterintuitive claim 
is that anxiety also functions as a signal that enables defences 
to be mobilised: the individual ‘can foresee and expect a trau-
matic situation of this kind which entails helplessness, instead 
of simply waiting for it to happen’. Freud writes of signal 
anxiety:
‘the present situation reminds me of one of the traumatic experiences 
I have had before. Therefore I will anticipate the trauma and behave 
as though it had already come, while there is yet time to turn it aside’. 
Anxiety is […] on the one hand an expectation of trauma, and on the 
other a repetition of it in a mitigated form.23
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Anxiety, here, takes a certain care of the self, just as an air raid 
siren is a warning that gives time for defence: signal anxiety 
mitigates helplessness by enabling the psyche to feel that ‘there 
is yet time’ to act and perhaps wait in a safer, more sheltered 
place. Waiting produces anxiety, but the neurotic repetitions and 
obsessive compulsions of anxiety also seem aimed at producing a 
world in which there would be time enough to wait.
Saint- Amour argues, surely correctly, that anxious waiting 
becomes one of the dominant affects of a 20th century subjected 
to two global conflicts and the threat of total war via aerial 
bombardment. Bowen’s ‘Mysterious Kôr’ certainly starts by 
imagining itself airborne: ‘from the sky, presumably, you could 
see every slate in the roofs, every whited kerb, every contour 
of the naked winter flowerbeds in the park’.24 But this story 
gestures beyond the affect of anxious anticipation by evoking 
another kind of waiting that links its ‘day within days’ to 
the sense that there could be ‘yet time’ that anxiety seems to 
promise. As Lisa Baraitser has argued in relation to the contem-
porary moment of late liberalism, when the spooling of time 
towards a possible future comes unravelled, experiences of 
interruption, suspension, delay and slowness strongly insist in 
affective life, often enduring in and as traditionally feminised 
practices of care.25 To speak of practices of care is to describe 
what Joan Tronto names as ‘everything that we do to maintain, 
continue, and repair our “world” so that we can live in it as well 
as possible’.26 And although such practices seem opposed to the 
trajectory of mobilisation that putatively underpinned military 
time, just as the contemporary moment seems allergic to the time 
of sustaining and enduring, the ‘non- impulsive major routine’ 
blown into existence by the threat of a cancelled future was a 
time shot through with both waiting and care.
While we might be anxious in relation to what we care about, 
‘care’ has a semantic doubleness that maintains a particular 
conceptual link between making provision and worry. To take 
care is to look after, to give cautious attention; but the very 
oldest usages of care link it to the Old High German chara: grief, 
lament and mental suffering.27 This linguistic proximity perhaps 
helps us understand something of the peculiar mirroring of the 
repetitive returns of an anxiety neurosis that produce a sensation 
of ‘yet time’ and a future, and the sustained attention and skilled 
anticipation of care time that ‘looks after’—making the possibility 
of a future in the present, even if only a minimal one. Maria Puig 
de la Bellacasa has recently described how care involves ‘a lot of 
hovering and adjusting to the temporal exigencies of the cared 
for’;28 and here the vigil of care and repetitions of reassurance 
seem not so far from the obsessive returns and hypervigilance 
of anxiety. But while care clearly takes time, it also produces an 
awareness of a temporisation of experience that resists the grain 
of master narratives of future. Puig de la Bellacasa suggests that 
care time runs counter to the temporality of anxiety, however: 
‘with regard to anxious futurity, feelings of emergency and fear, 
as well as temporal projections, need often to be set aside in 
order to focus and get on with the tasks necessary to everyday 
caring maintenance’.29 Certainly, fear of the future needs to be 
wound back while focusing in the present on the needs of others 
and everyday practices of endurance. But the repetitions of 
care, in ‘looking after’, nevertheless retain a certain, weakened 
commitment to a future—an ‘after’ into which selves and others 
might at least minimally endure—that is perhaps not to be fully 
separated from the ‘yet time’ signal anxiety looks to produce. 
In what follows, I want to outline the ways in which a collec-
tive awareness in military and civilian populations of threat that 
could not be easily fought but only endured—the awareness of 
‘total war’—became crucially entangled with both the suspensive 
temporalities of modernity and the practices of care such waiting 
times demanded and induced.
WAiTing mAChines
If, as Ghassen Hage has suggested, experiences of waiting are 
never just existential but are always historically articulated,30 
what does it mean to wait in a ‘disenchanted world’? Reinhart 
Koselleck has demonstrated that in Western Christian cultures 
a linear time of expectation orientated towards the Second 
Coming of Christ persisted into 16th century.31 In Benedictine 
monastic life, for example, a daily temporal ‘culture of vigilance’ 
was explicitly structured to meet St Paul’s demand for ‘constant 
prayer’ while awaiting the Second Coming,32 while in much pre- 
industrial or para industrial life waiting could be gathered up 
into more general cyclical rhythms and practices of activity as 
it played its part in contingent but imaginable returns. But as 
waiting for God as the final backstop for human experiences of 
endurance and unfulfillment became less culturally available in 
many Western cultures of modernity, there was a waning of that 
sense of final reckoning at the end of the ‘end times’ that gave 
waiting its eschatological value and its for a structuring quality. 
As Koselleck has shown, the timescapes of Western modernity 
decisively shifted as increasing secularisation emphasised human 
political and economic activity shaping the conditions of an 
unknown future.33 Indeed, by the 19th century, waiting was more 
clearly associated with the redundancies built into standardised 
or industrialised time regimes tabled according to the needs of 
modernity. As is well known, the advent of the paired systems of 
railway and telegraph wire both required and enabled national 
time regimes.34 But while mechanisation encouraged the tabula-
tion of time and its equation with productivity—as time became 
standardised, more easily quantifiable, more susceptible to being 
cut up into blocks that could then be exchanged as units—there 
emerged a sense that temporality might more authentically be 
found within subjective experience, in which time’s felt pace of 
passing became the essential mode of measure. As Henri Bergson 
affirmed in 1907, ‘all our operations on the systems that science 
isolates, rest in fact on the idea that time does not bite into 
them’.35 But in his account of waiting for sugar to dissolve in 
water, Bergson articulates how the movements and qualities of 
matter cannot be separated from the duration of consciousness 
that perceives them. ‘[T]he time I have to wait is not that mathe-
matical time’; rather, waiting time ‘coincides with my impatience, 
that is to say, with a certain portion of my own durations, which 
I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is no longer something 
thought, it is something lived’.36 For Bergson, the lived experi-
ence of duration—the essential quality of temporality that stood 
outside of positivist accounts of quantifiable time—obtrudes for 
philosophical reflection precisely in the moments it resists being 
seized and rationalised.
Anson Rabinbach has argued that World War I put an end to 
many of the agonised debates about Taylorism in Europe and 
the scientific management of time.37 Governments sacrificed 
new social policies on overwork, health requirements, and the 
protection of women and children in the workplace under the 
demands of industrialised warfare that simply could not wait. 
But war clearly did not only produce the efficient use of time, 
just as the lived experience of global industrialised conflict came 
to splinter the imagined ladder of positivist historical progress. 
Henri Barbusse’s Under Fire (1916)—one of the first extended 
literary accounts of life in the trenches—describes humans 
turned into the equipment of war:
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We are waiting. We get tired of sitting down, so we get up. Our joints 
stretch with creaking sounds, like warped wood or old hinges: damp 
rusts a man as it does a rifle, more slowly, but more profoundly. And 
we start to wait again, differently.
You are always waiting, in wartime. We have become machines for 
waiting.
For the moment what we are waiting for is grub. Then it will be 
letters. But everything in its own time: we’ll think about the letters 
when we’ve finished the meal. Then we’ll start to wait for something 
else…38
Imagined as mechanical equipment, the for in the soldiers’ 
waiting is endlessly substitutable, endlessly fungible. In the face 
of the impossibility of finding a place in a narrative of prog-
ress or, more pressingly, of bringing to consciousness the reality 
of what might imminently await them, Barbusse speaks of men 
transformed into ‘machines for waiting’ in which, at least at first 
glance, all time seems ‘occupied’ or seized, without any time 
being available.
Of course, to endure and experience becoming a waiting 
machine, to experience falling out of sync with standardised 
time, is precisely what mechanisms do not and cannot do. And 
for the phenomenological psychiatrist Eugène Minkowski who, 
unlike Freud, saw action in World War I, this disruption of dura-
tion, which Kate McLoughlin suggests is a precipitate of combat 
experience,39 defines the contours of mental illness itself. For 
Minkowski, mental illness almost always entails a perception of 
being detached from the temporality he represents as comfort-
able to human life: a ‘lived synchronism that we expect to find in 
the general feeling of moving with time and in step with it’.40 In 
a chapter of Lived Time drafted just after Armistice, Minkowski 
reimagines waiting not as boredom but as entwined with the 
nameless dread of what cannot be seized. He writes positively of 
‘activity’, but ‘expectation’ is different:
[it] englobes the whole living being, suspends his activity, and fixes 
him anguished, in expectation. It contains a factor of brutal arrest 
and renders the individual breathless. One might say that the whole 
of becoming concentrated outside of the individual swoops down in 
a powerful and hostile mass, attempting to annihilate him; it is like 
an iceberg surging abruptly in front of the prow of a ship, which in 
an instant will smash fatally against it. Expectation penetrates the 
individual to his core, fills him with terror before this unknown and 
unexpected mass, which will engulf him in an instant […] In the pres-
ence of an imminent danger we wait, frozen in place as if paralyzed 
by terror. 41
When describing a Russian soldier traumatised by war, 
Minkowski anatomises the temporal distortions experienced by 
the person incapable of inhabiting an active relationship towards 
the future. This sense of time does not simply match the height-
ened affect of anxiety with the a future experienced as a hostile, 
destructive force, however; anxiety starts instead to shudder into 
depressed affect. As the solider himself states: ‘I feel time flee, 
but I don’t have the sensation of following the movement; I have 
the feeling of turning in the opposite direction than the earth’.42
Although the Russian soldier may be reacting to his combat 
experience, Minkowski suggests that the psychic logic of war 
becomes totalised when the future comes to feel cancelled and 
the for of one’s waiting is lost, arrested, or imagined as a repe-
tition of the present saturated with the traumas of the past. To 
think back to Freud, the symptom may make an attempt to 
restore psychic equilibrium by producing a feeling that ‘there is 
yet time’, but in doing so it creates an over- abundance of time 
that does not pass. But if anxiety shades into depressed affect, 
depression can, in turn, shudder back into anxiety: Minkowski 
observes that ‘[w]hen the flow of time is only slowed down, it is 
the obsessive phenomena that intrude’.43 Indeed, he notes that 
the patient may attempt to control and reinstate a ‘mechanical 
progression’ of time through obsessive symptoms that give rise 
to an illusion of forward movement, but only fill the present by 
filling in for time’s ‘weakening dynamism’.44
The anxious sensation that ‘there is yet time’ can, of course, be 
transmuted into a hermetically sealed fantasy, just as Minkowski’s 
soldier feels he is the only person on earth rotating otherwise. 
Pepita ends up in her solitary fantasy space and time alone, 
without Arthur: ‘He was the password, but not the answer: it 
was to Kôr’s finality that she turned’.45 But waiting time might 
also produce other possibilities for experience. Bowen’s readers 
may wonder whether Pepita is looking to fall back into a ‘white 
time’ of the Imperial past,46 or if she is searching out a spectral, 
ultimately unwritten women’s or even queer time in Kôr and in 
‘She’. As she assertively detaches herself from Arthur and heter-
osexual coupling, rejecting his suggestion that they might ‘[p]
opulate Kôr’ with children, one wonders what other kinds of 
‘answer’ might await Pepita, even as Kôr can only be entered in 
a solitary way, here, rather than as a space of sociality in which a 
queer life might be lived.
Bowen’s accounts of the waiting time of war mostly concen-
trate on heterosexual erotic intensity and the strange individual 
freedoms lived out as a new time suddenly gaped between work 
and leisure—that defining timescape of industrialised moder-
nity. This element captures Lara Feigel’s imagination as she 
explores how an artistic aristocracy, already somewhat liberated 
from modern time regimes, pursued what Graham Greene later 
described as a somewhat ‘manic- depressive’ mode,47 strung out 
between the euphoria of surviving an air- raid, reactions to threat 
that were depressed or anxious by turn, the erotic charge set 
off by the imminence of death during the Blitz, and the melan-
cholic aftermath of postwar austerity. But if we return to Under 
Fire, written during World War I, another sense of waiting time 
flickers into view. There, becoming a waiting machine is not 
clearly anxious or arousing, although anxiety and bodily tender-
ness are not completely absent. ‘The frightful narrowness of 
communal life compresses us, adapts us and blends us into each 
other’,48 Barbusse writes. But in this ‘fatal contagion’ there is 
also a significant erosion of the distinctions between work and 
leisure, activity and inactivity. And Barbusse observes that in 
place of the ungraspable, unthinkable for of the squad’s waiting, 
certain practices of waiting with emerge that oddly confuse the 
mobilisation of the military industrial complex with domestic 
practices of care. Neither clearly productive nor unproductive, 
these minimal inclinations towards the immediate, pressing 
requirements of care use the time of waiting to render bear-
able an experience and produce a future in the face of a for that 
cannot be brought to consciousness.
Through a reading of Robert Graves’s 1915 poem ‘It’s a Queer 
Time’, Elizabeth Freeman suggests that World War I contains 
shards of a decidedly queer time of sociality that refuses ‘the 
foreshortened time of the patriot or the eschatological scheme 
where death leads directly to salvation’. Instead, the poem 
‘narrates military history’s failure to fully organise time towards 
nationalist ends’.49 If certain kinds of time in modernity pull 
human minds and bodies towards quickening and synchronising 
elements of everyday existence to maximise productivity, while 
‘offering up other spaces and activities as leisurely, slow, sacred, 
cyclical’, the soldier in the in- betweens of time regimes finds 
himself accessing ‘a time whose violence offers up queer possibil-
ities despite itself ’.50 This queer time, which is also a profoundly 
demobilised time (neither clearly productive nor obviously 
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unproductive), is indeed both produced by war and unfolds as 
one of its core experiences. Violence in the past is contained, if 
only momentarily, and violence in the future is anticipated but 
suspended through acts of care that remake the world, even if 
only minimally and temporarily.
In Mary Borden’s clear- eyed account of nursing in World War 
I, we get a sense of both the relentless demand for attentive-
ness produced by war and the impossibility of a delivering a care 
that could fully meet it. In The Forbidden Zone (1929) Borden 
outlines the temporal presence and violent ruptures that come 
with being charged with caring for others and the unknowable 
future that relationships with an other invoke. As she tends the 
wounded with the help of orderlies she calls ‘old ones’, time 
seems to stop:
It is a scene in eternity, in some strange dream- hell where I am glad to 
be employed, where I belong, where I am happy […] We are locked 
together, the old ones and I, and the wounded men; we are bound 
together. We all feel it. We all know it. The same thing is throbbing 
in us, the single thing, the one life. We are one body, suffering and 
bleeding. It is a kind of bliss to me to feel this.51
But following this presence and contact there is the inevitable 
rupture of triage: “No, not that one. He can wait”.52 Borden 
frequently describes her nursing of bodies in domestic terms: 
sewing, mending, laundry. Of one man waiting under electric 
light bulbs she writes, blankly: ‘leave him to cook there’. She 
necessarily turns her mind elsewhere, stepping out of the fantasy 
that there is no gap between need and fulfilment, but a voice 
calls out:
Sister! Oh, my sister, where are you?
[…] It is the blind man calling. I had forgotten him. I had forgotten 
he was there. He could wait. The others could not wait. So I had left 
and forgotten him.
She runs to him:
You are not alone, I lied. There are many of your comrades here and 
I am here, and there are doctors and nurses. […]
I thought, he murmured in that faraway voice, that you had gone 
away and forgotten me, and that I was abandoned here alone.
My body rattled and jerked like a machine out of order. I was awake 
now and seemed to be breaking to pieces.53
The experience of being an oiled machine, of being ‘locked 
together’ that paradoxically produces a feeling of humane ‘life’, 
jams. Borden cowers behind a screen. The fullness of time is 
ruptured by the reality of the insufficiency of her care and atten-
tion and the violence as she is forced, by the brute presence of 
finite bodies and a production line of injuries, to drop the fantasy 
of a perfect fit between need and resources that would allow 
her to wait fully with these men. In the face of this rupture of 
care, however, a small repair is offered back—another domestic 
gesture—that is minimally inclined towards a future that can 
only be meagrely inhabited, but that exists nevertheless. In a 
gesture of making do, of all one can do, one of the old orderlies 
sticks his grizzled head around the corner of the screen: ‘He held 
his tin cup in his hands. It was full of hot coffee. He held it out, 
offering it to me. He didn’t know of anything else he could do 
for me’.54
DemObiliseD Time
In her postscript to the The Demon Lover (1945), Elizabeth 
Bowen wrote that ‘[l]iterature of the Resistance has been steadily 
coming in from France. I wonder whether in a sense all wartime 
writing is not resistance writing’. She noted, however, that such 
resistance was not necessarily martial or political; rather, ‘[p]
ersonal life here, too, put up its own resistance to the annihila-
tion that was threatening it’. Although Bowen insistently empha-
sises ‘individual destiny’,55 as in Pepita’s solitary fantasy, clear 
attention to the intersubjective qualities of waiting time can be 
found in a ‘Resistance’ play from 1953 that has its own relation-
ship to war and occupation. Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot 
certainly implies a metaphysics of temporality and waiting’s 
place within that; but criticism has come to understand Godot 
as linked both to Beckett’s experiences in the French Resistance 
and to the affects of waiting in a socio- historical moment in 
which the promise of the future has sheared away.56 Denuded 
of any sense of progress or a future that might be seized, Godot 
evokes instead a present that is queerly occupied. Neither weak 
enough to cease and desist, nor strong enough to leave, Vladimir 
and Estragon stand, or sit, and wait; they endure and persist, not 
really waiting for Godot, but waiting with, and sometimes even 
on one another. Keeping occupied, ‘passing the time’ together in 
games of give and take, of violence and of care, indeed becomes 
the quality of this time without qualities. In Beckett’s 1957 
Endgame, interpretable as both a displaced account of World 
War II and an anticipation of a nuclear Holocaust that would 
reach beyond the ruined cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
Hamm cannot stand and Clov cannot sit. Clov tells Hamm there 
is no more painkiller; indeed, all the things they may have once 
been waiting for have been exhausted. The alarm clock does 
not work anymore, and yet the time that time takes to come to 
an end remains as the characters endure in an extenuated yet 
nevertheless finite state. They are dependent; they are ‘obliged 
to each other’.57 Indeed, as Barbusse and Beckett both show, 
where people wait alongside others social practices of waiting 
with seem to emerge.
As is well known,58 in the mid 1930s, Samuel Beckett sought 
psychotherapy for what would now likely be diagnosed as an 
anxiety disorder. When Beckett met his psychotherapist Wilfred 
Bion in 1934, there was much in their social background that 
was shared; but Beckett understood that one key experience was 
not. Bion was born in 1897 and just 9 years older than Beckett, 
but, like Beckett’s friend the poet Thomas McGreevy, Bion had 
survived Ypres; as a tank commander in World War I he had also 
won the Distinguished Service Order for ‘conspicuous gallantry 
and devotion to duty’. Beckett wrote to McGreevy telling him 
that he experienced Bion ‘against a background of Toc H and 
Tank Corps that makes me tremble’.59 He could hardly have 
known then how his own experiences in the French Resistance 
in World War II, so decisive in turning him into the figure we 
now recognise as Beckett, might bring his work into peculiar 
proximity to the later Bion’s psychoanalytic commitment to slow 
process and practices of waiting.
In 1938. Bion began a training analysis with John Rickman, 
but in 1940 was recommissioned into the Royal Army Medical 
Corps. And it is clearly in the wake of one war and in anxious 
anticipation a second that Bion wrote his first published paper, 
‘The “War of Nerves”: Civilian Reaction, Morale and Prophy-
laxis’. Here, Bion addresses the dangers for civilians of anxious 
waiting in relation to the anticipated violence of ‘intensive total-
itarian war’.60 Suggestively, Bion’s essay was likely written up 
during the waiting time known as the ‘phoney war’ when there 
were no major military land operations on the Western Front 
and no civilian experience of aerial bombardment. The essay 
followed the convening of a voluntary committee of medical 
officers, army psychiatrists, and members of the Tavistock 
Clinic in 1938, who were concerned with the inevitability of 
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a devastating air- attack on London, the likelihood of civilian 
panic, and the potential for an ‘epidemic of shell- shock’ compa-
rable ‘to that observed during the war of 1914–18’.61 In his 
essay, Bion argues that an enemy can wage war by arousing 
infantile emotions of fear and dread in order to distract the 
population from the conflict being fought in external reality. For 
civilians during the time of the phoney war, Bion notes that ‘the 
field is held by phantasies of air- raids’, with this form of attack 
represented as the very ‘opposite of a psychotherapeutic proce-
dure in which the knowledge of the unconscious on the part 
of one participant is used for the benefit of another’.62 Bion’s 
essay is thus concerned with developing a form of ‘psychological 
A.R.P.’63 (air- raid precautions) as a practice of care for a civilian 
population newly exposed to military conflict. Bion asserts that 
they must not be left to languish in a kind of waiting time (what 
Minkowski would call ‘expectation’) in which phantasy can take 
hold. Instead, as soon as an air- raid siren goes off, ‘[t]he alarm 
[…] must be a call to action, and there must be an action to 
which every man and woman is called’.64 Solitary, isolated and 
isolating waiting, which can lead to neurosis and what the later 
Bion invokes as ‘not a fear of dying made tolerable, but a name-
less dread’, must be replaced with communal effort and action 
towards a graspable, survivable future.65
Bion had learnt from personal experience how standard 
temporalities unravel during war. As he put it in the posthu-
mously published The Long Week- end, even when only on the 
way to the Front, ‘time had already come to mean something 
that could not be measured by watches’.66 Although war was 
clearly full of events and the most profound anxieties, in the face 
of a cancelled or unimaginable future, thinking and feeling and 
their relationship to life and the events of history paradoxically 
began to leak away:
We stood there and waited for something to happen. We had not 
even begun to realise that nothing happens in war, or – which comes 
to the same – nobody knows what happens. I would have thought I 
was being made a fool of if I had been told that, even years after the 
war and another like it, I still would not know something so simple 
and obvious as who had won.67
Something happens, but it cannot be mobilised in the realm 
of knowledge. Bion describes the experience of combat itself 
sometimes producing a manic ‘dis- association, de- personali-
sation [t]hat was a way of achieving security—spontaneous, 
automatic, but potentially costly as it involved not knowing of 
the imminence of death’.68 Alongside this dangerous dissocia-
tion, he recalled, over- again in shame- pocked prose accounts, a 
terrible evacuation: a moment on the Amiens- Roye road when 
the 20- year- old Bion found himself unable to tolerate waiting 
with a dying young runner, Sweeting, whose chest had been 
blown apart. ‘Mother, Mother, write to my mother, sir won’t 
you? … Mother, Mother, Mother’, implores the ‘boy’. The terri-
fied, vomiting Bion shouts: ‘Oh for Christ’s sake shut up’.69 For 
Bion, the carapace of military camaraderie before and after such 
events was a profoundly inadequate defence in the face of such 
extremity. He writes elsewhere that during the war he often ‘felt 
that all anxiety had become too much; I felt just like a small 
child that has had a tearful day and wants to be put to bed by 
its mother; I felt curiously eased by lying down on the bank by 
the side of the road, just as if I was lying peacefully in some-
one’s arms’,70 although he was not to develop his thinking about 
how such catastrophic fears might be absorbed, contained, and 
understood, rather than evaded in fantasy or vomited out, for 
decades. Barbusse, however, was able simply to note the minimal 
emergence of certain kinds of waiting with that sat alongside an 
ungraspable, unthinkable for that oddly confused the mobilisa-
tion of the military industrial complex with domestic social prac-
tices. Here, time was held and contained, not exactly through 
the practical, futural activity Bion had recommended for civil-
ians in 1940, but through certain social, para- domestic practices 
of waiting—a being present with.
Significantly, the British civilian population did not, in 
general, collapse in the face of aerial bombardment in the way 
Bion feared it might; instead, often people just waited it out, 
living on and getting on, with more or less success, through daily 
practices in which the temporal relationship to the future and 
unbearable anxiety was endured, borne, and contained within 
minor, domestic modes of care, without being seized or trans-
formed. The Mass Observation project gives some insights into 
these practices.71 Diarist 5278, a female, single civil servant born 
in 1912, records her experiences in the air- raids of August 1940. 
Initially, there seems to be a lack of contact with reality and its 
dangers as she refuses to enter the nearest air- raid shelter, stops to 
post a Mass Observation response, and answers back to an angry 
A.R.P. warden. Later, in the shelter, she writes of sitting commu-
nally with others, listening to them ‘nagging about broken social 
engagements and meals waiting’: ‘Atmosphere cheerful: people 
pull faces and say “Pretty bad” and repeat rumours and facts 
and wonder when the next one’s coming. At Dad’s works they 
had a sweepstake, by quarters of an hour, as to when the next 
air raid would come’.72 There is psychological defence in the 
domestication of fears of annihilation into the ‘Pretty bad’, and 
the reshaping of the imminence of death, in which the gamble 
of living becomes explicit, into the banal risk of a bet in which 
the future itself is not one’s stake. But we also see the ‘hovering 
and adjusting’ that Puig de la Bellacasa suggests is characteristic 
of ‘care time’, in which time is ‘levelled down’, as Bowen has 
it—flattened into minimal articulations of a future that comes to 
be held between people.
But if this waiting becomes attentive to what is proximate and 
present, it also opens up time for existential consideration. As 
Bowen says ‘[w]alls went down; and we felt, if not knew, each 
other. We all lived in a state of lucid abnormality’.73 Diarist 5278 
indeed becomes reflective:
Strong feeling about everything, that it may be the last of its kind, so 
have (to) enjoy it. Was grateful for the moon, grateful for the sunny 
morning, grateful for a seat in the train, grateful for a comfortable 
body, grateful for being able to shut my eyes, & occasionally shut my 
mind, to present difficulties. Came over my mind that that’s escap-
ism. I bolster up my self esteem by reminding myself that I’ve wor-
ried and nagged and bored all my friends, since 1933 until Munich, 
with talking about Nazism and war and the menace to freedom: went 
to meetings, read books, converted Conservatives. So when the war 
came, I leaned back & let my mind wander […]74
The question of what happened to people’s thinking in this ‘lucid 
abnormality’, of what could be contained within the psycho-
logical A.R.P. of communal action or what took place as minds 
began to wander, was of acute interest to British psychoanalysis. 
As Stonebridge writes, ‘any standard history of the Blitz can tell 
us that early fears of national panic and civilian air- raid psychi-
atric casualties were over- exaggerated, […] only one genuine 
case of “bomb neurosis” was reported to the British Psycho- 
Analytic Society’. Indeed, as she goes on to note, by 1942 the 
‘Mass- Neurosis Myth’ was replaced by a ‘No- Neurosis Myth’, 
the psychoanalyst Edward Glover complained.75 Of course, the 
reality was more complex and variegated, as Edgar Jones has 
demonstrated in his work on the traumatic neuroses of the World 
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War II. For although admissions to psychiatric hospitals went 
down during the war, the prevalence of seemingly psychogenic 
gastrointestinal complaints soared as digesting and processing 
anxious experience did not repeat the culturally overdetermined 
and still stigmatised symptoms of the shell shock of World War I; 
rather, they worked themselves through a nervous gut.76
Psychoanalysis also remained concerned and stimulated by 
what the war revealed about the time of psychic life, alongside 
the psychic life of time. In 1942, Bion and John Rickman set up 
the first Northfield experiment in what was the Northfield Mili-
tary Hospital in Birmingham. Bion and Rickman were in charge 
of the training and rehabilitation wing. Their aim, ostensibly, 
was to improve morale by creating a ‘good group spirit’.77 To 
this end, Bion instructed the men to do an hour’s exercise every 
day and join a group.78 While this looked like traditional occu-
pational therapy, the real therapy was the struggle to manage 
the interpersonal strain of groups organising things together and 
submitting to the dependence of sociality. Bion indeed used this 
experiment with groups to understand how powerful unarticu-
lated beliefs, phantasies, and what he called, after Melanie Klein, 
‘projective identifications’, could cement people within identi-
ties that enabled complicity and the potential for atrocity.
Bion went on to formulate a fundamental distinction between 
‘work groups’ and ‘basic assumption groups’. As he outlines 
in Experiences in Groups in 1959, basic assumption groups 
are governed by a ‘proto- mental system in which physical and 
mental activity are relatively undifferentiated’.79 The entry into 
such groups is ‘instantaneous, inevitable and instinctive’,80 and 
there is a tendency to lose contact with external reality and 
act out primitive and primary processes of mind, such as split-
ting people and acts into good and bad objects, to use Klein’s 
terms. As Daniel Pick explains, ‘in the world of “basic assump-
tions”, thought is a misnomer, and the communications at stake 
are better understood as un- reflexive forms of action’.81 Bion 
indeed writes of the ‘basic- assumption mentality’ that ‘[t]ime 
plays no part in it; it is a dimension of mental function that is 
not recognised; consequently all activities that require an aware-
ness of time are imperfectly comprehended and tend to arouse 
feelings of persecution’.82 In thrall to the immediacy of instan-
taneous, instinctive action rather than the passage of time that 
produces the ground for thinking, such groups find it hard to 
learn, acknowledge guilt and admit others into their cohort. The 
‘work group’, however, can hold to the space of time of thinking 
that enables a relationship between, rather than a confusion of, 
internal and external reality; the ‘work group’ can form an alli-
ance for thinking that can suspend action until it is thinking’s 
precipitate, rather than its substitute.
To explain this further we need to turn to the influential set 
of ideas Bion went on to develop about psychic violence and 
the value of psychoanalysis in a postwar world. Following his 
work with John Rickman, Bion undertook a training analysis 
with Klein between 1946 and 1952, and her work was key in 
developing his understanding of the link between aggression, 
violence and the evacuation of thinking. Perhaps strangely, 
instead of understanding thoughts as produced by thinking, 
Bion suggests in a 1962 essay that thinking evolves as a capacity 
for absorbing and processing ‘thoughts’ otherwise experienced 
as intolerable. Maybe influenced by the insistence of gastro-
intestinal complaints in the patients he saw or his own emetic 
experience on the Amiens- Roye road in 1918, Bion made a link 
between ‘digesting’ and the processes of thinking. For Bion, 
most incidences of psychopathology are precisely structured by a 
‘breakdown in the development of the apparatus for “thinking”’, 
where thoughts run amok.83 The aim of psychoanalysis is thus 
for analyst and analysand to suspend the action that risks evac-
uating ‘thoughts’ experienced as contaminating or lacerating 
to the self, and instead to contain and absorb—to digest—
them over time and within psychical understanding, as analyst 
processes and gives back thoughts as material to think with. 
Even decades after the war, thoughts are described by Bion via 
an imaginary defined by modern conflict; they are ‘evacuated 
at high speed as missiles to annihilate space’.84 For Bion, the 
only way to transform thoughts as an aerial bombardment to 
be managed through what he calls ‘evasion by evacuation’,85 is 
to suspend this mobilisation that seeks to rid of the psyche of 
thoughts. Instead, analyst and patient must learn together how 
to wait and to think. For Bion, if thoughts are missiles, genuine 
thinking becomes a space of embodied containment that allows 
the world to be taken into the self, absorbed and digested over 
and through time, rather than evacuated as violently invasive. 
For Bion, such thinking, imagined according to the processes of 
a body able to absorb rather than be blown apart by bullets and 
bombs, indeed produces a space and time where violence can 
be held and thought about rather than enacted. For the later 
Bion, alongside the practical benefits of encouraging communal, 
collective action to contain the anxiety of waiting time, waiting 
and thinking with others becomes a ‘shelter’ for the experience 
of time that is perhaps the only authentic psychological A.R.P.
Thinking Time
Virginia Woolf ’s essay, ‘Thoughts on Peace in an Air Raid’, was 
published in October 1940, but it gestated just a little earlier, 
during the final weeks of the Battle of Britain and on the eve 
of the London Blitz. Woolf writes, there, of what waiting for a 
bomb to drop might do to thinking:
It is a queer experience, lying in the dark and listening to the zoom of 
a hornet which may at any moment sting you to death. It is a sound 
that interrupts cool and consecutive thinking about peace. Yet it is 
a sound—far more than prayers and anthems—that should compel 
one to think about peace. Unless we can think peace into existence 
we—not this one body in this one bed but millions of bodies yet to 
be born—will lie in the same darkness and hear the same death rattle 
overhead. Let us think what we can do to create the only efficient 
air- raid shelter while the guns on the hill go pop pop pop and the 
searchlights finger the clouds and now and then, sometimes close at 
hand, sometimes far away a bomb drops.86
Thoughts buzz like planes and bombs but, for Woolf, the 
suspended time of waiting for a bomb to drop also produces a 
demand for thinking that, in Bion’s terms, might effect a contain-
ment of unbearable anxiety and function, perhaps, as ‘the only 
efficient air- raid shelter’. For she asserts that soldiers and civil-
ians alike are subjected to a ‘subconscious Hitlerism’, and, Woolf 
argues, what women might do in this moment of suspension, of 
apprehension, is to create an alternative to catastrophe through 
their capacity for thinking.
In the June of 1940, Melanie Klein was also exploring her 
patients’ experience of the external war and their ability to face 
it by linking it with their internal phantasies. She wrote in an 
unpublished lecture: ‘If the feeling that external war is really 
going on inside—that an internal Hitler is fought inside by a 
Hitler- like subject—predominates, then despair results. It is 
impossible to fight this war, because in the internal situation 
catastrophe is bound to be the end of it’.87 Klein also wrote 
extensive clinical notes on her British patients’ reactions to 
the Anschluss of Austria and Germany in March 1938 and the 
anxious wait, known as the Munich Crisis, before a settlement 
was reached in September 1938 that permitted the German 
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annexation of Western Czechoslovakia. While Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain famously spoke of ‘peace in our time’, 
Klein was concerned with a more complex time of psychic life 
marked out by aggression and attack, shame and guilt, and by 
experiences in the past repeated in the present. These reflections 
on the ‘war inside’ were not divorced from external, political 
reality, however. Indeed, Klein wrote that part of their purpose 
was precisely to explore ‘[t]he phenomenon of whole nations 
submitting to dictators and being kept under by them […] We get 
to understand this better if we study the reactions of people who 
are not directly implied, but stirred in their feelings by happen-
ings like the overrunning of Austria’.88 For both Woolf and 
Klein, the contours of ‘subconscious Hitlerism’ or an ‘internal 
Hitler’ seemed more palpable in experiences of waiting than in 
those of military action.
Klein was also less interested in her patients’ fears of external 
reality than in analysing an inner reality of primal experiences 
of annihilation and destructive rage that had their genesis in the 
childhood past, lived on in phantasy and the present of psychic 
experience and were brought to the fore in the face of a fright-
ening future. In notes sent to Edward Glover she wrote that ‘[w]
ith most of my patients the situation before the crisis activated 
deep anxiety- situations, their fears about the actual external 
dangers thus becoming much more acute’,89 but the analysis of 
these now more easily accessible internal ‘anxiety- situations’ and 
an understanding of their genesis in a disturbance of early rela-
tions to early ‘objects’ (usually the parents), relieved some of the 
external fears. When able to work through fears of a bad father 
(Hitler) threatening a good but vulnerable mother (for whom 
the Austrian, Jewish Klein frequently came to stand in), many 
of her patients became seemingly ‘more capable of judging the 
external situation, and of making decisions’.90 She observed that 
‘[i]n those days when the war seemed inevitable […] the patients 
became less anxious and seemed to accept the position with a 
certain amount of resignation and determination, and the wish 
to help and co- operate had become stronger’.91
As Bion noted, people tended to become less anxiously para-
lysed and more focused on social cooperation when external 
reality gave them the opportunity to shift their attention from 
the uncertain waiting that gave fertile ground for the difficult, 
unprocessed material of internal phantasy, towards activity. As 
Klein herself put it, relief was produced by
externalising an internal danger- situation, since a definite knowledge 
that war was imminent made it less phantastic, and encountering it 
meant coping with it […] Anxiety was further relieved by the feeling 
that, by means of this reparation carried out in the outside world, the 
inner world would be repaired.92
But while Bion was, at this point, concentrated on psycholog-
ical A.R.P. and the practical ends towards which waiting time 
might be directed, Klein was more concerned with what an 
alleviation of an internal anxiety- situation might mean psycho-
analytically. A precipitate identification with Chamberlain as 
a good father seemed for many to be followed by a feeling of 
numbness, then guilt and shame, as reality suggested that ‘bad 
parents’ had gained power, both internally and externally; there 
was ‘a despair of goodness surviving in the internal and external 
world’.93 Klein similarly inferred that ‘the attitude of bowing to 
a dictator’ might be another way of evading internal anxiety: a 
‘means of denying one’s own hatred of him in order to escape 
from fears and conflicts the child may feel’.94
By the summer of 1940, just before the Blitz was to bring total 
war to London, Klein seemed clear, however, that the anxiety 
produced by external circumstances brought both danger and 
opportunity. If unprocessed, internal phantasies could lead to 
psychic catastrophe and death through either a manic evasion of 
threat (not waiting long enough) or a dangerous paralysis (waiting 
too long) that signalled a ‘suicidal incapacity to deal with external 
dangers, and ultimately the means of destroying the dangerous 
Hitlers inside’.95 As Stonebridge has suggested, here Klein does not 
simply interpret ‘war anxiety in terms of instinctual anxiety’, as 
some have claimed; historical conflict is not ‘subsumed by the ahis-
tory of phantasy’.96 But by allowing anxiety about the external war 
to illuminate an anxious internal reality, and by suspending the ‘war 
inside’ by bringing it, over time, into analytic understanding, Klein 
wrote that she saw ‘patients’ courage grow, depression diminish 
and the capacity to make decisions, etc increase when hatred and 
guilt connected with early phantasies had been analysed’.97 For 
Klein, it was thus the capacity of analysis to contain and under-
stand hatred and guilt over time that enabled the patient to hold 
on to ‘the feeling that goodness cannot be ultimately exterminat-
ed’—a feeling ‘based on a better balance between facing danger 
and yet relying more on internal goodness and trust in some good 
object’.98 Here, then, Klein describes an analytic fulfilment of 
the promise for signal anxiety that Freud holds out in 1926: the 
alarm of anxiety produces a repetition of the past in the anxious 
present that, through the containment of analytic thinking, enables 
the possibility that ‘there is yet time’ rather than temporal ‘evac-
uation’—a time in which courage and belief in the endurance of 
good objects and a future endures over the psychic catastrophe of 
an ever- repeated ‘war inside’.
Woolf is clear that being ‘under fire’ halts thinking:
The sound of sawing overhead has increased. All the searchlights are 
erect. They point at a spot exactly above this roof. At any moment a 
bomb may fall on this very room. One, two, three, four, five, six … 
the seconds pass. The bomb did not fall. But during those seconds 
of suspense all thinking stopped. All feeling, save one dull dread, 
ceased. A nail fixed the whole being to one hard board. The emotion 
of fear and of hate is therefore sterile, unfertile.99
The phallic quality of the ‘erect’ searchlight suspends thinking 
and time in a barren fashion. This state does not last indefinitely, 
however; instead, there is a subtle shift into another kind of waiting 
in which memory and a sense of sociality, rather than solitary 
anxiety or depressed sterility, returns. Directly that fear passes, the 
mind reaches out and instinctively revives itself by trying to create:
It reaches out to the memory of other Augusts—in Bayreuth, listen-
ing to Wagner; in Rome, walking over the Campagna; in London. 
Friends’ voices come back. Scraps of poetry return. Each of those 
thoughts, even in memory, was far more positive, reviving, healing 
and creative than the dull dread made of fear and hate. Therefore 
if we are to compensate the young man for the loss of his glory and 
of his gun, we must give him access to the creative feelings. We must 
make happiness. We must free him from the machine.100
As Kirsty Martin has noted, the injunction to ‘make happiness’ sits 
oddly in this lyrical passage by seeming to suggest ‘the creation of 
happiness as a form of national project’.101 But, Martin insists, it 
has its place in Woolf ’s fraught attempts to hold in mind the rela-
tionship between profoundly personal states of happiness experi-
enced in the intensity of ‘the moment’ and the demands for the 
good life of the many that could be marked in sociohistorical time.
Klein, like Woolf and diarist 5278, writes of the need to connect 
with happiness in the moment in ways that look like a temporary 
denial of the reality of historical danger: ‘We look at nature, we 
read a book, we play with a child, we enjoy food, etc, and we have 
to remind ourselves that our life and country is at stake’.102 But, 
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she writes, if this careful attention to ‘good objects and (belief) in 
goodness ultimately’ is used not to deny reality but as a commit-
ment to the endurance of these elements, it may, in fact, ‘help us to 
take steps to preserve goodness externally, and may internally help 
us to keep calm in the face of danger’.103 The time that this air raid 
‘blows into existence’, then, is one of creativity and dependence in 
which action and violence are somehow suspended, but the possi-
bility of caring for ‘good objects’ in the internal and external world 
endures. For Woolf, this happiness seems to be a kind of women’s 
time, just as her account of women’s writing insists on a non- 
injurious fidelity to ‘the moment’. Women must make happiness 
in the present. This comes, however, through creative endeavour 
imagined neither as utterly individualistic nor as completely social-
ised. Both of these possibilities are refused in the essay in Woolf ’s 
resistance to mortgaging the present to a simple idea of the future 
of nationalist myths or making children that would merely feed the 
war machine. Neither explicitly productive nor flagrantly unpro-
ductive, this potentially queer fidelity to the complex sociality of 
the present swells as if gestating a kind of waiting time; it produces 
a suspended present not of machines or national time regimes but 
of embodied selves that need tending, that need tenderness. And 
what this produces, for Woolf, at least for this moment, is a place 
and time for going on through forms of creative, subjective soci-
ality in which the world is maintained, continued and repaired—it 
is cared for—even when all going on seems radically foreclosed.
Over time, Bion let go of the idea of psychoanalysis as a grand 
curative project. Towards the end of a life as scarred and moved 
to thinking by conflict as the century it spanned, Bion sought to 
give up waiting for, just as Western cultures of modernity became 
increasingly uncertain of religious ideas of deliverance, posi-
tivist narratives of history, or a progressive future into which 
one could simply step. Instead, he suggested the importance of 
analytic endurance and waiting with—an attitude of presence and 
patience modelled after Keats’s notion of ‘negative capability’. In 
his 1973–74 Brazilian lectures, Bion described a model of analytic 
thinking that resists the defences of intellectualisation and the 
tendency to get taken up with ‘memory’ (of previous sessions) or 
future ‘desire’ (for a cure, or interpretation):
Instead of trying to bring a brilliant, intelligent, knowledgeable light 
to bear on obscure problems, I suggest we bring to bear a diminu-
tion of the ‘light’—a penetrating beam of darkness; a reciprocal of 
the searchlight […] The darkness would be so absolute that it would 
achieve a luminous absolute vacuum. So that, if any object existed, 
however faint, it would show up very clearly.104
Here, the beam of darkness becomes a mirror image of the search-
light used in World War II to create artificial moonlight to dazzle 
and illuminate the enemy. This mode of negative yet containing 
attention, as analyst and patient wait together, instead becomes 
a way of doing justice to what exists in the present, including 
feelings of ‘unthinkable anxiety’, ‘nameless dread’, and acts of 
psychic violence that annihilate and ‘kill time’. What is evoked 
instead is a capacity to wait for the anxious bombardment of 
thoughts to pass and for something else, not necessarily a grand 
narrative of the future, but a commitment to care and to a time 
in which good objects will endure—a way of going on when all 
going on might be purposeless—to emerge in its wake.
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